Low inflation, a high net savings surplus and institutional restrictions keep the Japanese long-term interest rate low by Jansen, Pieter W.
 Low inflation, a high net savings surplus and institutional restrictions keep the 
Japanese long-term interest rate low 
 
Pieter W. Jansen § 
 
24 April 2006 
 
Abstract 
This paper explains that the interest rate on long-term Japanese government bonds is low in 
comparison with other industrialised countries for four main reasons: lower inflation, net 
savings surplus, institutional restrictions and home bias. Monetary policy and institutionalised 
purchases of government bonds by semi-government agencies keep the market demand for 
bonds high. We find that since the 1970s Japanese interest rate movements are better 
explained by the current account balance than in other industrialised countries. This is caused 
by sizeable net oversavings and institutional reasons increased the impact of oversavings as 
such on the long-term interest rate for Japan. Hence, the institutional reasons increase the 
coefficient value of the savings-investment balance. A reason for the existence of the high 
national net savings surplus could be that unsustainable budgetary deficits in Japan called for 
a Ricardian response. We doubt whether Ricardian equivalence is here the driving factor: 
household savings have actually fallen over the nineties. Corporate savings, in response to 
overcapacity and poor investment outlook, have risen more strongly. This has kept the private 
and national savings balance positive. There is also some indication that ageing has 
contributed to the structural current account surplus for Japan. 
 
 
Keywords: long-term interest rate, current account balance, Japan, Ricardian equivalence, 
ageing. 
 
 
Jel-code:  E43 
                                                          
§
 Research officer at the Free University of Amsterdam and investment strategist at AEGON 
Investment Management and and Research officer at the Free University of Amsterdam, email: 
pjansen@aegon.nl. 
 2 
 
Low inflation, a high net savings surplus and institutional restrictions keep the 
Japanese long-term interest rate low 
Pieter W. Jansen § 
 
Abstract 
This paper explains that the interest rate on long-term Japanese government bonds is low in 
comparison with other industrialised countries for four main reasons: lower inflation, net 
savings surplus, institutional restrictions and home bias. Monetary policy and institutionalised 
purchases of government bonds by semi-government agencies keep the market demand for 
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by sizeable net oversavings and institutional reasons increased the impact of oversavings as 
such on the long-term interest rate for Japan. Hence, the institutional reasons increase the 
coefficient value of the savings-investment balance. A reason for the existence of the high 
national net savings surplus could be that unsustainable budgetary deficits in Japan called for 
a Ricardian response. We doubt whether Ricardian equivalence is here the driving factor: 
household savings have actually fallen over the nineties. Corporate savings, in response to 
overcapacity and poor investment outlook, have risen more strongly. This has kept the private 
and national savings balance positive. There is also some indication that ageing has 
contributed to the structural current account surplus for Japan. 
 
I Introduction 
When we observe the nominal interest rate, it seems that the Japanese long-term interest 
rate deviates from the Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP). For instance, the nominal interest 
rate differential with the United States was 343 basis points on average from early 2000 till 
the end of 2004. When we correct these differences for inflation differences over this period, 
the interest rate differential is reduced significantly to 15 basis points, but - apart from the 
United States – real inflation differences with other industrialised countries are still quite 
substantial (see table 1). Although inflation developments explain an important part of nominal 
interest rate differentials, there is still a large gap in real terms. In this paper we try to answer 
the question how it is possible that the Japanese interest rate is so low in comparison with 
other large industrialised economies. 
 
Table 1: Long-term interest rate differentials (foreign rate -/- Japanese) (in basispoints)  
 Germany United Kingdom France Canada United States 
Nominal terms +463 +493 +474 +526 +343 
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Real terms +101 +161 +73 +69 +15 
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream 
 
Charts 1 and 2 show respectively the long-term interest rate developments in Japan, 
Germany and the United States in nominal and real terms. The Japanese nominal long-term 
interest rate has been slightly lower than the German and US 10 years rate during the 1980’s 
and the gap expanded in the nineties. Chart 2 shows that the gap is substantially smaller in 
real terms. 1 
 
Chart 1: Nominal Japanese, US and German long-term interest rates  
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream  
 
Chart 2: Real Japanese, US and German long-term interest rates   
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 We calculated the real long-term interest rate by deflating the nominal rate by the 5 year 
average consumer price index annual percentage changes as a proxy for long-term inflation 
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At first glance it seems odd that for a country that is fully integrated in the international capital 
market the assumption of portfolio theory, which implies that the yield on a specific bond 
instrument is related to the risk of the borrower, does not seem to hold for the Japanese 
government bonds.2 The Japanese budgetary position deteriorated substantially during the 
nineties and has been on an unsustainable path for some years.3 Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s have lowered the Japanese sovereign bond rating to below the US Treasuries rating in 
2003.4 It does not seem likely that the difference is explained by a liquidity premium either. 
Currently the US government bond market and the Japanese are the largest worldwide.5  
 
To investigate whether other factors, besides the difference in inflation rates, explain why the 
Japanese interest rate is lower, we analyse the Japanese interest rate formation in section 2 
in a broad model. An interesting outcome of the model is that savings-investment balances 
seem to be a more important factor in explaining Japanese long-term interest rate movements 
in comparison with other industrialised countries. We discuss the relation between the 
savings-investment balance and the long-term interest rate in section 3. Fukao and Okuba 
(1984) found a statistical significant relationship between the Japanese interest rate and the 
current account surplus, which relation gained significance since capital market liberalisation 
took place in the seventies in Japan. In section 4 (demographic changes) and section 5 
(Ricardian equivalence) we discuss possible reasons for the savings-investment surplus. In 
section 6 we argue that institutional factors and home bias might cause the coefficient value 
for the savings-investment balance to be higher in Japan than elsewhere. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
II Japanese long-term interest rate determined in a broad defined interest rate model 
This section presents an error correction model for the Japanese long-term interest rate.6 We 
confront the outcomes for Japan with other industrialised countries. The model incorporates a 
number of interest rate theories. Through encompassing  these theories, a range of variables 
are included. The model consist of interest rate variables such as the foreign long-term 
interest rate and the domestic short-term interest rate and it consists of non-interest rate 
variables such as savings, investment, business cycle, equity return and exchange rates. This 
broad interest rate model is based on the model discussed by Den Butter and Jansen (2004). 
The ERM is specified as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
2
 See for instance Mishkin and Eakins (1998) or Fabozzi (2000) 
3
 See for instance recent country reports of the IMF (2003) and the OECD (2003A) 
4
 See for instance www.standardandpoors.com or www.moodys.com. 
5
 See for instance BIS Quarterly review December (2004) 
6
 The augmented Dickey-Fuller test pointed out that the Japanese long-term interest rates 
interest rate and the explanatory variables taken into consideration showed to be integrated of 
order I(1), we decided to specify the equation with an error correction mechanism. 
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Where Cycle is a business climate indicator, RS is the short-term interest rate, NEE is the 
nominal effective exchange rate, RLF is the foreign long-term interest rate, INF is inflation, CA 
is current account balance and EQR is expected equity return (inverse price/earnings ratio). 
For the calculation of the foreign long-term interest rate we divided the world in three large 
interest rate blocks: US, Japan, Euro. For the euro area we used the German interest rate as 
the central long-term interest rate. If a country is not located in any of these regions (such as 
Canada, Australia, Switzerland and the UK) the foreign rate is an unweighted of these three. 
For the others the foreign rate is calculated as an average of the two other region (US: 
average German and Japanese rate). Insignificant variables have been removed from the 
estimated equation to reduce noise in the model. Table 10 shows empty spaces for these 
insignificant variables.  
 
Table 10: Estimation results of the annually specified long-term interest rate model (period: 
1970-2003) 
 Japan France US UK Germany Italy Neth Belg Can Spain Aus 
Business cycle 
 
           
Short int rate  0.250 
(4.57) 
0.374 
(5.72) 
0.161 
(3.72) 
0.368 
(4.32) 
0.483 
(6.16) 
0.198 
(5.32) 
0.138 
(3.59) 
0.962 
(4.10) 
0.395 
(6.43) 
0.322 
(6.73) 
N.E.E. -0.031 
(-2.26) 
  -0.048 
(-3.74) 
    -0.033 
(-2.30) 
  
Foreign int rate 0.407 
(3.73) 
0.723 
(5.98) 
 0.896 
(7.04) 
0.644 
(6.17) 
0.415 
(1.68) 
0.717 
(7.69) 
0.733 
(6.82) 
0.962 
(7.30) 
0.951 
(5.68) 
0.454 
(2.76) 
CPI inflation 
 
           
CA balance 
 
-0.294 
(-2.85) 
          
Expected 
equity return 
 0.154 
(2.28) 
 0.200 
(4.66) 
       
Constant -0.055 
(-0.61) 
-0.021 
(-0.24) 
0.048 
(0.36) 
-0.074 
(-0.89) 
0.006 
(0.08) 
0.014 
(0.08) 
0.018 
(0.26) 
0.013 
(0.20) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
0.140 
(0.99) 
0.049 
(0.44) 
LT relation -0.323 
(-2.52) 
-0.413 
(-2.64) 
-0.399 
(-3.68) 
-0.348 
(2.55) 
-0.410 
(-3.41) 
-0.472 
(-3.34) 
-0.331 
(-2.71) 
-0.448 
(-3.45) 
-0.676 
(-4.12) 
-0.351 
(-2.61) 
-0.348 
(-3.11) 
Adj R-squared 0.590 0.857 0.623 0.856 0.764 0.664 0.831 0.866 0.875 0.799 0.723 
DW Statistic 1.56 1.67 1.94 2.05 1.75 1.40 1.65 1.70 1.91 1.88 1.71 
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Akaike inf crit 1.56 1.45 2.24 1.41 1.30 2.99 1.04 0.89 1.22 2.21 2.04 
F-statistic 12.50 44.60 24.98 38.90 35.62 21.40 53.28 70.14 56.94 34.09 28.90 
S.D. dep var 0.77 1.23 1.15 1.19 0.90 1.76 0.93 0.97 1.17 1.52 1.21 
 
In the ECM we estimated with annual data since 1970, the Current account balance is 
statistically significant for Japan, but did not add to explaining interest rate movements for 
other countries. Nevertheless, the current account balance is not the variable in the Japanese 
model with the highest t-value. Just as for other countries, the foreign long-term interest rate 
has the highest t-value. The short-term interest rate is not significant in the annual model for 
Japan (unlike for the other countries). Although in a single variable model the short-term 
interest rate does explain long-term interest rates in Japan, it is not significant in the broader 
defined model. Because correlations between the independent variables are relatively low 
(between –0.44 and +0.31 for Japan), this has not likely been caused by multicolinearity. 
Additionally, omitting any of the other variables in the model does not lead to statistical 
significance of the short-term interest rate. The business cycle indicator is not statistically 
significant for any of the countries.7  
 
The strong relevance of the current account balance for the Japanese long-term interest rate 
determination in comparison with other countries, will be analysed in the remainder of this 
paper. In section 3 we look further into the empirical relation between savings-investments 
balance and the long-term interest rate and the savings behaviour itself. Then we discuss two 
specific possible causes for oversavings in section 4 (demographic change) and section 5 
(Ricardian equivalence). Section 6 discusses that institutional factors likely cause a higher 
coefficient value for Japan. Section 7 concludes. 
 
III Savings-investment balance and the long-term interest rate 
In chart 3 we show the relation between the current account balance and the nominal long-
term interest rate. We see a historical negative relation between the two variables (the current 
account figures are shown on the left axis in reverse order). Nevertheless, in the nineties this 
relation had not been as strong. For instance, in the period 1992 to 1996 both the long-term 
interest rate and the current account balance decreased (in the chart they move in opposite 
direction). 
 
Chart 3: Japanese current account balance and the long-term interest rate 
                                                          
7
 Although not presented here, in a model with a quarterly frequency the business cycle, 
measured through a business confidence indicator, is statistically significant for the three 
largest  countries in the panel: United States, Japan and Germany.  
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For the theoretical determination of the long-term interest rate, we can apply the standard life 
cycle framework. First, we assume that the (real) long-term interest rate (r) is negatively 
influenced by saving and positively by investment. Hence, the CA (current account balance) is 
an indication of tension on the capital market. With a CA deficit it is relatively difficult to 
finance investments domestically, putting upward pressure on r. 
 
(2) ( )+−= ISfr ,  
 
(3) ( )CAfr −=  
  
Where the current account balance is determined by national saving minus national 
investment: 
(4)   nn ISCA −=  
 
Section 2 showed that only for Japan the current account balance explained long-term 
interest rate movements in a broad model. In this section we estimate ERM equations for the 
group of countries using the current account balance as the singular variable. The purpose of 
this is to isolate the current account balance and remove possible disturbance of the other 
independent variables. 
 
Both the nominal long-term interest rate and the current account balance (% GDP) are 
integrated at the first order when we apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. We estimate an 
error correction model with the following specification:  
 
(5)   ( )1121 1 −−+∆+=∆ − CARCACR ll γββ  
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The model is estimated with annual data over the period 1971 to 2003 (for France the 
estimate period starts since 1976 because of limited data availability). We initially estimated 
the model for 11 industrialised countries, but found a statistical relationship for the four 
countries which are presented in table 3. We did not find a statistical significant relationship 
for the US, Germany, Italy, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain.  
 
Table 3: Estimation results ERM CA model 
 Coefficient 
CA* 
LT-
correction 
Constant Adj 
R-squared 
DW-
statistic 
Akaike SD 
dependent 
variable 
F-stat 
Japan -0.46 
(-3.82) 
-0.07 
(-1.26) 
-0.14 
(-1.27) 
0.304 1.56 2.04 0.77 8.00 
France -0.74 
(-2.88) 
-0.07 
(-0.68) 
-0.21 
(-1.01) 
0.192 1.56 3.08 1.20 4.22 
UK -0.29 
(-1.59) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(-0.75) 
0.021 1.54 3.25 1.19 1.34 
Australia -0.37 
(-2.81) 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
0.156 1.35 3.13 1.21 3.97 
* T value in brackets 
 
For Japan, the current account balance is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level 
with a t-value of –3.82. The adjusted R-squared is 30.4%. Also for France and Australia the 
current account balance is significant on the 1% level, but the adjusted R-squared is 
somewhat lower. For the UK, current account movements have very limited significance in 
explaining long-term interest rate movements. 
 
Additionally, we have analysed the relation between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables through a VAR analysis. We note that because of limited data 
availability we are careful with drawing conclusion from the outcome of this model. In the 
estimated model, both the CA balance and the long-term interest rate itself are used as 
endogenous variables in the VAR equation. We have used two lags which has given the 
model the following specification8:  
 
(6)   
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The VAR-equation for Japan has an adjusted R-squared of 91.9% and a standard deviation of 
2.6 (in interest rate %-points). The standard deviation is substantially larger than in the ECM 
(0.8). The table is sorted by explanatory power (adjusted R-squared). The strongest relation is 
                                                          
8
 At two lags, both the Akaike and Schwartz criteria are minimised while the residual of the 
VAR estimate shows no unit root according to the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
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found for Japan, followed by Belgium and France. Only for Japan, Belgium, Canada, Italy and 
The Netherlands we find the theoretically expected long-term negative effect of a change of 
the CA balance on the long-term interest rate.  
 
Table 4: estimation results VAR CA model 
 R(-1) R(-2) CA(-1) CA(-2) Constant Adj R-
squared 
F-stat Akaike S-dev 
dependent 
variable 
Japan 0.773 0.221 -0.510 0.421 -0.007 0.919 89.1 2.4 2.58 
Belgium 0.857 -0.121 -0.322 0.044 2.819 0.894 56.0 2.8 2.73 
France 1.253 -0.192 -0.063 0.479 -0.915 0.891 54.2 3.3 3.57 
Australia 1.150 -0.156 0.087 0.293 1.388 0.876 55.8 3.2 3.10 
Italy 1.312 -0.411 -0.266 0.217 1.055 0.863 48.3 3.9 4.32 
Spain 1.224 -0.268 -0.070 0.128 0.395 0.857 39.9 3.9 4.08 
UK 1.160 -0.227 -0.188 0.279 0.949 0.849 44.6 3.3 3.06 
Canada 1.080 -0.241 -0.311 0.134 1.059 0.815 35.2 3.2 2.58 
US 1.017 -0.171 0.217 0.024 1.511 0.795 31.1 3.2 2.43 
Netherlands 1.040 -0.243 -0.057 -0.139 2.034 0.745 23.6 2.8 1.81 
Germany 1.099 -0.300 -0.066 0.161 1.295 0.712 19.5 2.8 1.70 
 
The chart below shows the propagation of one standard deviation innovations of the current 
account balance and its affect on the long-term interest rate in the estimated VAR model for 
Japan. 
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Has Japan oversaved? 
The strong negative relation between the long-term interest rate in Japan and the savings-
investment balance questions whether this is due to a strong imbalance in net national 
savings. In other words: is oversaving the reason for the low interest rate in Japan? In a 
number of OECD countries the gross national saving rate decreased during the 1970s and 
1980s and stabilised or rose marginally during the 1990s. In Japan the gross national saving 
rate decreased slightly during the 1990s, but remained higher (26.4% in 2001; see table 
below) than in other OECD countries, except for Korea, Norway and Finland (OECD (2003b)). 
According to the OECD (2001) government savings are the main indicator of the direction of 
movement of the saving rate in the 1990s for the OECD countries. However, in Japan 
government savings decreased in the period 1995-1999 by 4%-points of GDP, while private 
savings rose with 2%-points of GDP (OECD (2001)). In other OECD countries there was a 
tendency towards fiscal consolidation in the nineties, causing the government savings to 
increase, while private savings decreased.  
 
Table 2: Gross national savings as a percentage of nominal GDP  
period Japan United States Germany France United Kingdom Italy 
1985 32.0 17.2 --- 18.1 18.2 22.6 
1990 33.6 15.9 --- 21.5 16.2 20.7 
1995 29.4 16.4 21.8 19.5 15.7 21.6 
2001 26.4 16.1 19.8 21.4 15.4 20.0 
Source: OECD (2003b) 
 
Does this indicate that Japan is oversaving? Oyama and Yoshida (1999) tested, using the 
modified golden rule approach, whether the Japanese are oversaving in relation to other 
major industrialised countries. According to Oyama and Yoshida the capital to GDP ratio in 
Japan is not different than in other industrialised countries (approximately 30-35%), while the 
saving rate is clearly higher in Japan than in some other industrial countries.  
 
In the Modified golden rule approach the optimal saving rate is determined through the share 
of capital to GDP, social time preference and the natural growth rate. It appears in Oyama 
and Yoshida’s study that at a time preference rate of zero Japan’s saving is optimal. Other 
industrialised countries are on the optimal saving rate, when the time preference rate equals 
the real interest rate. A small time preference rate for Japan is defended by Miranda (1995). 
Miranda calculated a time preference rate of below 2% and concluded that Japan did not 
oversave. Assuming that the actual saving rate is the optimal, Oyama and Yoshida calculate 
the implicit time preference. They find a stable time preference rate for Japan and Germany at 
respectively 0% and 2%, while in other industrialised countries the time preference rate varies 
with the real interest rate.  
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Two main reasons for high net savings could be identified: demographic influences and 
Ricardian equivalence which we discuss in section 4 and 5. 
 
IV Demographic influences caused high net savings? 
Ageing effects could have kept the national net savings high while government net savings 
deteriorated. As countries are getting closer to the eve of retirement of the baby boom 
generation, and individual savings are peaking according to the life cycle savings model, this 
would theoretically lead to the expectation of large current account surpluses just before 
retirement of the baby boomers. The lifecycle savings-investments framework which we 
introduced in section 3 can be used for such an analysis. In a two period model, economic 
agents smooth their consumption equally over their expected lifetime. There is no bequest 
motive in this model, contrary to the Ricardian assumption. In this model there are two types 
of agents: young (Y) and old (O). We assume that only generation Y works. In this period 
generation Y saves for retirement, these savings are dissaved in the next generation (O), 
which is the only income to O. Consumption in period t is determined as follows: 
 
(7)   otytt CCC +=  
 
The present value of an individual lifetime consumption at t: 
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How much an individual consumes at each stage of his/her life depends on time preference 
(ρ). When ρ equals r, than consumption at both stages are equal. ρ and r theoretically do not 
necessarily have to be equal in an open economy. Individuals then attempt to smooth their 
consumption perfectly over their lifetime. Consumption of an individual at the two stages in life 
are related according to the presentation in equation 9. 
 
(9) ( ) yto CrC )1(11 +−=+ ρ  
 
Or rewritten: 
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In period +1 O sells its savings of which a part may be invested abroad when savings 
accedes domestic investment demand, but because Y saves the exact amount as old initially 
did at t, the current account balance remains unchanged: 
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(12)   tCACA =+1  
 
Demographic shocks lead to a mismatch between savings of the working population and 
dissavings of the retired generation. Equation 11 and 12 will not balance when a similar shock 
does not occur with trading partners. Ageing is a phenomenon which is observed in all 
industrialised countries. Because the ageing countries cannot have a significant current 
account surplus as a whole. The non-ageing world is relatively small in economic terms. This 
means that ageing will have to be absorbed domestically. For instance through a lower 
interest rate and an increase of investment. With a positive birth rate shock to a country, by 
the time this generation reaches working age, there will (theoretically) be a savings surplus 
when this generation reaches working age (Y in the model). In this simple example we define 
that the economy consists of only two generations at a certain time, where agents in the first 
generation works and save. When the demographic shock is temporary, the next generation 
will be smaller. Therefore, when the “baby boom” generation retires and starts dissaving, the 
dissaving will be larger than the saving of the working population.  
 
Still, the effect on the current account is ambiguous. There are two other effects that are 
relevant: government savings and private investments. According to Higgins (1998) 
investments peak earlier in the life cycle than savings. Investments keep capital/labor ratios 
constant early in the working life. This means that by adding more periods to our theoretical 
model there is likely to be a current account deficit early in working life of the baby boom 
generation, a surplus later during working life and a deficit at the end of the working life. 
Government savings, which is mainly effected through pension payments and health care 
payments, is likely to show the same pattern as private savings, if this is not met by 
compensation measures on the government revenue side. If larger expenditures are met by 
enhanced revenues (tax hikes) there is no effect on net government savings.  
 
For a detailed analysis of ageing influences on gross and net savings see for instance 
McMorrow and Roeger (2003), Turner et al (2003) or Higgins (1998). The positive influence 
on net savings in Japan is confirmed by OECD (2001) estimations. These estimates show 
that the weakening of the government budgetary balance in Japan caused the (net) private 
saving rate to rise by 2.3%-points, but this was mainly offset by dissaving related to 
population ageing (-2.2%-point) in the period 1995 to 1999.  
 
V Ricardian equivalence a cause for high net savings? 
Ricardian equivalence could be a second reason for higher net savings. Upper and Worms 
(2003) found that fiscal policy plays an important role in the determination of long-term real 
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interest rates. But the authors state that only in Japan low real rates coincided with high debt 
and government borrowing. The Japanese government budget balance has decreased from 
+2.0% of GDP in 1990 to -7.1% in 2002.9 Despite a worsened government budget, the current 
account remained in surplus while the long-term interest rate fell over the years. A low real 
GDP growth and continuing presence of deflation (GDP deflator measure) since 1998, have 
resulted in a sharp rise of the government debt to GDP ratio. The unsustainability of the fiscal 
situation in Japan has been analysed by both the IMF (2003) and the OECD (2003a). This 
unsustainability seems to justify a Ricardian response by the private sector. We first discuss 
theoretically the impact of unsustainable government deficit in a neoclassical model. Further 
on, we will analyse sector savings developments in Japan to see what caused rising 
oversaving of the private sector and whether this can be reasonably expected to be due to 
Ricardian equivalence.  
 
If we interpret current unsustainable deficit as temporary deficits (which they are by 
definition), we can once again use the Neoclassical saving-investment model. Government 
borrowing will have to be compensated through higher taxes during the current economic 
planning horizon of economic agents. Hence, the outcome of the Ricardian dynasty savings 
model is the same as the outcome in the Neoclassical life cycle model: current taxpayer will 
end up with the bill of the fiscal stimulus. While the government debt is at an unsustainable 
path, it is likely that any further deterioration is met by an enhancement of private saving, 
keeping net national savings relatively constant. 
 
Net national saving is the sum of private net saving (SP-IP) and government net saving. 
Government net saving is equal to net borrowing/net lending balance (BG). The current 
account balance, as stated by equation 13, shows that the current account balance is the 
difference of foreign assets (A) held at period t-1 and t. 
(13)   pt
g
t
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Equation 15 and 16 show how private gross saving and government net saving are 
determined. Hence, if there would be a government debt, the first term on the right hand side 
of equation 15 would be negative. T is total tax receipts/payment, C private consumption, Y 
labour income and G equals government consumption. 
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We use the model to theoretically simulate unsustainable fiscal policy, which we interpret in 
the model as a temporary budget deficit. The temporary deficit is compensated in the next 
period. We start with fiscal stimulance of D, a change in government savings of –D, which will 
be fully paid back in period +1 through a lump sum tax of D(1+r). In our two generations 
model this doesn’t impact generation O. To this generation the fiscal deficit is permanent, so, 
in the absence of a bequest motive, generation O will consume it’s share of the stimulance. It 
does change consumption smoothing decisions of Y. If the population is balanced between Y 
and O, this will lead to a rise in consumption of ½(D). Y consumers at t will keep their 
consumption unchanged. At +1 Y will have to pay ½(D)(1+r) in taxes. Y responds in a full 
Ricardian way, by investing its share at r to be able to pay ½(D)(1+r) at +1. The result is that 
the current account balance will fall by ½(D), because government saving (SGt) declines by D 
and private saving (SPt) rises by ½(D).  
 
In period +1 the government will pay off its debt of D through higher taxes in period +1 of 
(1+r)Dt. Generation Y in period t has become to O in period +1. It dissaves ½(D) in assets 
which it kept to pay for the extra tax which accumulated including interest to ½(D)(1+r). 
Generation Y in +1 is confronted with a one period extra tax expenditure of ½(D)(1+r). Y in +1 
will try to smooth consumption over both periods, so Y decreases its savings by half of its 
share in this incidental tax. In period +1 the current account balance increases by ¼ (D)(1+r); 
see equation 18. 
 
At time +2 Y is not confronted with tax consequences of the fiscal stimulance of t. Generation 
O dissaves less than generation Y saves. The difference is  ¼ (D)(1+r). From period +3 the 
current account balance is back to zero.  
 
The developments of the current account balance from t to +3 is shown in the below shown 
four equations: 
 
(17)   DDDCAt 2
1
2
1
−=+−=  
 
(18)   ( ) ( ) ( )rDrrDCA +=+−+=+ 14
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4
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4
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Chart 5: Change in savings of a 1 period 1D fall in the government balance (for simplicity r is 
not taken into account here but would be of influence in t=1) 
 
The above presented model analysis shows that temporary deficits have less effect on the 
current account balance than permanent deficits, and through this on the interest rate. We 
assumed a fiscal imbalance which leads to a temporary average deficit for a full generation 
which is corrected in the next generation. In this case one of the two generations responds 
through higher savings (young) and one generation does not (old). There is a partial 
Ricardian response. When we tune into the Japanese budgetary situation, the unsustainability 
and high future ageing costs, a case can be made for a short-term or medium term budgetary 
correction. Hence, a correction within the generation in which the budgetary expansion was 
initiated, implying a full Ricardian effect. This would encourage savings and keep the interest 
rate low, maybe even when the government credit rating deteriorates further. The urgency of 
the situation (a quick response is required) would mean that most of the Ricardian 
assumptions, which are often argued to be irrealistic will not be tested (see for explanation of 
the assumption for instance Barro (1989) and Bernheim (1989)). Any additional fiscal 
stimulance will likely be corrected within the current living generations, without the need for a 
bequest motive. 
 
Is there currently evidence of Ricardian equivalence in Japan? Some studies addressed this 
issue previously, but unfortunately some date back to before the unsustainability of the 
government finance got apparent. Horioka (1993) finds that the Neoclassical lifecycle theory 
is more applicable to Japan than the Ricardian Dynasty theory. According to Horioka 
bequests are however prevalent because of risk aversion (timing of death and medical costs). 
Even in the Japanese case there could be liquidity constraint consumers and even myopic 
-1.5
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consumers. Kimura on quote in Oyama and Yoshida (1999), finds that 60-80% of the 
residents respond in a Ricardian equivalence way, while 20-40% responds in a Keynesian 
way. Also Kuttner and Posen (2001) find, in a more recent study, that Ricardian equivalence 
is perhaps in evidence but does not perfectly neutralise fiscal policy. So even in the Japanese 
situation, there is some evidence of a Keynesian reaction. Both Ricardian and Neoclassical 
theories neglect liquidity constraintness of the Keynesian framework. Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989) claim that liquidity constraintness of consumers is substantial in the industrialised 
countries. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate this effect at 50% and Masson, Bayoumi 
and Samiei (1996) estimate that 60% of a change in government saving is compensated by 
private savings in a number of industrialised countries. These numbers are lower than the 
previous mentioned studies point out for Japan, even at times of government financial stability 
in Japan.  
 
While there is a theoretical case for the private sector to respond to further fiscal deterioration 
by increasing savings, we evaluate how private entities have responded in the eighties and 
nineties. Chart 6 shows net national savings, net private savings and net government savings 
in Japan since 1980. The chart shows that despite a deterioration in government savings, 
national net savings remained quite stable, even a minor rise over the nineties can be 
detected. Especially the private response to fiscal stimulus since the early nineties is striking 
in the chart. Masson, Kremers and Horne (1994) find a statistical significant relationship 
between net Japanese foreign assets and government debt (negative relationship) in the 
period 1950-1990, but this relation is not confirmed by chart 6 for the nineties. 
 
Chart 6: Public and private savings 
 
As chart 7 shows, the private response to deteriorating government finances does not find its 
cause in a rise of net household savings which has slowly fallen since the eighties (from 15% 
GDP to 6%). The corporate net savings have offset the government financial deterioration.   
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Chart 7: Private savings components 
 
But is this rise in corporate savings really a Ricardian response where we would expect this 
behaviour to take place mainly with households? The rise in corporate savings is more likely 
to be caused by other factors such a lack of investment opportunities through a fall of 
potential growth and the need for debt restructuring. In the nineties a further slowdown in 
economic growth and large corporate losses as a result of the collapse of the asset bubble, 
which led to overcapacity and a rise of nonperforming loans, have most likely stimulated 
corporate savings. As long as overcapacity is a problem, corporate savings are likely to 
remain high. Liquidity abundance through a broad monetary policy in absence of investment 
opportunities could have led to savings enhancement by companies. The relationship 
between corporate savings and government savings seem likely to be related through the 
business cycle and is not a direct Ricardian type response to expected enhanced future 
corporate taxation.  
 
The correlation matrix below shows that in all countries there is a strong negative correlation 
between first differences of government net savings (Sg) and private net savings (Sp) 
(between -0.72 and -0.92). Almost in all countries the relation is stronger between 
government and corporate savings (Sc) than between government and household savings 
(Sh). Household savings has a positive sign (see correlation matrix) in relation to the interest 
rate in most countries. How savings respond to a change in r depends on the net effect of two 
factors. First, the income effect predicts that a rise in r implies that less savings is required. 
The rise in r will lead to higher consumption in the future. This enables higher consumption in 
the current period. Second, the substitution effect, implies that the price of current 
consumption rises. A higher interest rate than the time preference would enhance savings. 
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The substitution effect tends to dominate in most countries. The correlation for Japan is 
almost zero. 
 
Investigating the causality is another way of looking whether government savings influences 
private savings. Using the Granger causality technique we found that the causality runs from 
corporate savings to government savings and not vice versa. Overall (see appendix) not 
much causality can be found between sectoral savings for a set of 11 industrialised countries. 
Only statistically significant causality from government savings to corporate savings in 
Germany and the Netherlands and from corporate to government savings in Japan and 
Belgium can be found. 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix (first differences; annual data; 1970-2003) 
 R-Sg R-Sp R-Sc R-Sh Sg-Sp Sg-Sc Sg-Sh Sc-Sh 
United Kingdom 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.25 -0.92 -0.82 -0.49 0.11 
Spain 0.14 -0.22 -0.35 0.16 -0.89 -0.67 -0.54 -0.08 
United States 0.38 -0.32 -0.47 0.33 -0.88 -0.75 -0.18 -0.34 
Japan 0.16 -0.37 -0.42 0.01 -0.88 -0.81 -0.31 -0.04 
Belgium 0.33 -0.45 -0.48 -0.08 -0.83 -0.70 -0.44 -0.02 
Australia 0.19 -0.37 -0.50 0.35 -0.83 -0.74 -0.12 -0.32 
Canada 0.22 0.10 -0.04 0.30 -0.81 -0.74 -0.60 0.42 
France 0.15 0.43 -0.62 0.29 -0.77 -0.64 -0.35 -0.16 
Netherlands -0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.18 -0.76 -0.35 -0.77 -0.04 
Italy 0.04 -0.19 -0.37 0.17 -0.75 -0.51 -0.53 -0.06 
Germany 0.01 -0.25 -0.35 0.34 -0.72 -0.66 -0.44 0.16 
 
 
We estimate a model in which we test how components of private savings explain changes in 
government savings, and further, how all savings components explain long-term interest rate 
movements.  
 
The first equation is the following: 
(21)   ( )11211321 1 −−− +−−+++=∆ − CSSRSSCS chlchg γγβββ  
 
where, gS is net government savings, hS  net households savings and cS
 
net corporate 
savings. 
 
Table 6 below shows that for all countries household savings and corporate savings are 
statistically significant and explain changes in government net savings in the period 1970-
2003. All have the theoretically expected negative sign. The correlation between corporate 
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savings and household savings is usually quite low (see table 5). Therefore, multicolinearity is 
not a problem here. It is most likely that private savings responds to government savings, but 
as mentioned earlier, it could be coincidental through the economic situation. Government 
savings usually deteriorate through automatic stabilizers when the economy turns into a 
recession. The recession induces savings of private entities. This response indicates risk 
aversion and does not indicate consumption smoothing. From a neoclassical perspective, it 
could also indicate a previous overestimation of permanent income, for instance by 
overestimating job security until the downturn came. Table 6 shows that the statistical relation 
is stronger for corporate savings than for household savings. This supports the argument 
made earlier: especially for corporations, with limited investment opportunities, savings are 
likely to respond stronger to an economic downturn. Table 6 also shows that the results for 
Japan are not that different in an international context. The equations for eight out of eleven 
countries show a higher t-value for corporate savings than for household savings. In case of a 
Ricardian response by households in Japan due to unsustainable Japanese government 
finances, the results would clearly have to be different for Japan compared to others with 
much more solid government finances. The adjusted R-squared for the Japanese equation 
ranks roughly in the middle. Adjusted R-squared for all countries are significant. They range 
from 53.4% for Australia to 83.3% for the United States. The adjusted R-squared for Japan is 
77.0%. Overall, a slightly stronger relation is found between government net savings and the 
private savings component than found by Masson, Bayoumi and Samiei (1996), possibly 
because we tested the savings components individually. 
 
Table 6: Regression results of first difference government savings model (period 1980-2003) 
Country Household 
savings 
Corporate 
savings 
Long-term 
relation 
Constant Adj R2 
 
DW-
stat 
F-stat Aikake 
US -0.68 (-4.76) -0.79 (-12.23) -0.08 (-0.72) -0.12 (-1.13) 0.833 1.55 54.03 1.88 
Belgium -0.67 (-3.43) -0.90 (-8.01) -0.14 (-1.52) 0.32 (1.79) 0.809 1.65 32.07 2.69 
Spain -0.74 (-5.81) -0.53 (-7.08) -0.22 (-1.01) 0.04 (0.27) 0.791 1.48 28.72 2.05 
Japan -0.68 (-3.76) -0.82 (-8.18) -0.29 (-2.39) 0.17 (1.05) 0.770 0.90 25.62 1.86 
UK -0.89 (-6.20) -0.58 (-7.98) -0.31 (-2.64) -0.12 (-0.84) 0.763 1.48 35.26 2.57 
Italy -0.87 (-5.94) -0.54 (-3.99) -0.26 (-1.57) -0.04 (-0.21) 0.689 1.52 17.28 2.67 
Canada -0.67 (-3.04) -0.47 (-3.55) -0.29 (-2.29) 0.12 (0.48) 0.685 1.28 16.25 2.94 
Germany -1.12 (-3.72) -0.51 (-5.13) -0.19 (-1.30) -0.06 (-0.37) 0.646 1.726 19.88 2.79 
France -0.70 (-3.77) -0.66 (-5.61) -0.25 (-1.66) -0.05 (-0.41) 0.646 1.34 15.61 1.93 
Netherl. -0.74 (-6.48) -0.45 (-4.60) -0.27 (-1.94) 0.01 (0.08) 0.627 1.49 15.03 2.59 
Australia -0.41 (-2.68) -0.47 (-6.21) -0.23 (-1.98) -0.03 (-0.17) 0.534 1.49 13.25 2.65 
* coefficient value and t-value in brackets 
 
We additionally tested how, and which, savings components explain the interest rate 
formation (equation 22). The savings components explain on an adjusted basis 26.6% of the 
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movements in the long-term interest rate in Japan (see table 7). Government savings and 
household savings are not statistically significant.  
 
(22)   ( )11312114321 1 −−−− −−−−+∆+∆+∆+=∆ − CSSSRSSSCR gchlgchl γγγββββ   
 
It appears that a model estimated with savings components does not explain interest rate 
movements better for Japan than for other industrialised countries. The net government 
balance does not lead statistically significant explanatory power for any industrialised country.  
 
Table 7: Estimation results of the ERM long-term interest rate model (period 1980-2003) 
Country Government 
savings 
Household 
savings 
Corporate 
savings 
Long-term 
relation 
Constant Adj R- 
Squared 
Canada  0.69 (4.27)  -0.54 (-3.20) -0.03 (-0.19) 0.385 
Germany  0.68 (2.87)  -0.44 (-2.68) -0.06 (-0.40) 0.232 
United States  0.68 (3.00)  -0.19 (-1.83) 0.01 (0.06) 0.226 
Australia   -0.25 (-2.86) -0.08 (-1.23) -0.01 (-0.05) 0.223 
France   -0.52 (-2.56)  -0.16 (-0.70) 0.188 
United Kingdom  0.41 (2.01)  -0.02 (-0.30) -0.12 (-0.60) 0.062 
Japan   -0.21 (2.16) -0.30 (-2.14) -0.18 (-1.24) 0.266 
Italy  0.90 (3.10)  -0.36 (-1.94) -0.01 (-0.04) 0.261 
Netherlands  0.27 (2.57)  -0.12 (-1.20) -0.19 (-1.13) 0.161 
Spain       
Belgium       
 
VI Institutional factors and home bias cause a higher coefficient value 
We found that the savings and investments balance explains the Japanese long-term interest 
rate movements better than for other countries. For a country integrated in international 
financial markets the savings-investment balance should not have a significant impact on 
domestic long-term interest rate formation, because the mismatch can be financed 
internationally. But institutional factors could have increased the importance of net savings on 
domestic long-term interest rate formation in Japan.  
 
The bond market is almost fully domestically financed in Japan: 96% of Japanese 
government bonds are held by Japanese citizens.10 If a high savings surplus is strongly home 
biased, the interest rate could still remain low. A strong home bias can also indicate that the 
explanation of the savings balance is predominant in explaning the interest rate movements, 
which turns an economy with open capital markets through low capital mobility effectively into 
a closed economy. 
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The amount of government bonds held by the government itself is substantial in comparison 
with other countries. Table 8 reports on bonds held by the domestic citizens and bonds held 
by central bank and government. The rate of bonds held domestically in Japan was at the end 
of the nineties higher than in the US and the UK. The much lower percentage of US 
government bonds held by US citizens than British bonds by UK citizens can be explained 
from the dollar’s international currency position. The relative amount of bonds held by central 
bank and government is much higher in Japan than in both other countries. 
 
Table 8: holdings of government bonds 
 Held domestically Held by Central 
bank/government 
Japan 90.0% 46.3% 
United States 63.1% 13.1% 
United Kingdom 85.6% 3.6% 
Source: Rhee (2001) 
 
Since the late 90’s these numbers have risen for Japan. Since March 2001, the Bank of 
Japan started buying government bonds as part of its monetary policy framework. OECD 
(2005) gives some insight in the distribution of government bond holdings. According to the 
OECD study the Bank of Japan bought since March 2001 till the end of 2004 one third of new 
government bond issues. The total amount in government bonds that the Bank holds valued 
60 trillion yen in government bonds (12% GDP) by the end of 2004. By September 2003 the 
Bank of Japan held 14.6% of outstanding government bonds. In total, the government held 
50.4% of the outstanding bond in 2003. Including besides the Bank of Japan the postal 
saving (15.4%), postal insurance (9.6%), fiscal loan fund (10.7%). The banks are holding 
20.3% of the total outstanding government debt. Because of these large government holdings 
and given that commercial banks’ holdings are kept for a long-term to improve solvency 
ratio’s after substantial profit loss through nonperforming loans, the liquidity of Japanese 
government bonds is much lower than would be expected by the size of outstanding 
government debt. The large government demand, and especially the purchases of the Bank 
of Japan since 2001, are likely to have kept the long-term interest rate much lower. 
 
Home bias might also be voluntarily. The exchange rate risk, which is for a large net creditor 
such as Japan difficult to hedge, can be an important reason for Japanese investors to be 
home biased in their investment decisions. Jorion (1996) shows that investing abroad, in a 
situation that the home country has a structural current account surplus, like Japan had in the 
eighties and nineties, hedging the currency risk would be expensive. Since 1970 the yen 
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appreciated in real effective terms 80% and 90% since 1990.11 Large exchange rate losses in 
the past might also have had a psychological effect. This home bias may up to now have 
been more important than worries over the governments solvency ratio.  
 
VII Conclusions 
In relation to other industrialised countries the Japanese government pays a low interest on 
its government debt, especially when we take into account the relative low rating on 
government bonds. We found that the current account balance significantly explains 
movements in the Japanese interest rate. Much better for Japan than for other industrialised 
countries. For most countries there is no statistically significant relation at all.  
 
We investigated two possible causes for the existence of oversavings: ageing and Ricardian 
equivalence. Some evidence indicates that ageing has contributed to the net savings surplus. 
Although a theoretical case can easily be made for Ricardian equivalence in Japan we do not 
find evidence. The strong response of private saving to government deficits is not caused by 
household saving but by corporate saving. In our view, the rise in corporate saving is more 
likely to be a response to losses and the worsened investment outlook than it is Ricardian in 
nature. We found a statistical significant Granger causality running from corporate savings to 
government savings in Japan, but not vice versa. 
 
Although Japan has a higher savings surplus than elsewhere, we think that the higher 
coefficient value is cause by institutional factors and a strong home bias. Institutional factors 
such as a substantial domestic holdings of government bonds by international standards and 
especially more recently the Bank of Japan purchases of government bonds keep demand for 
Japanese government bonds higher. This has likely increased the downward pressure on the 
long-term interest rate compared to foreign long-term interest rates of recent.  
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APPENDIX 
The table below shows the results of the Granger causality test. The H0 represents that 
the first mentioned variable does not Granger cause changes in the second mentioned 
variable. Only in three cases, highlighted in the table, is there a causal relationship. 
 
Table: Granger causality test results on savings component relations 
 
 
 
 
  
Government savings 
to 
household savings 
Household savings 
to 
government savings 
Government savings 
to 
corporate savings 
Corporate savings 
to 
government savings 
  F-stat P-value F-stat P-value F-stat P-value F-stat P-value 
Canada 1.08 0.52 7.37 0.06 3.12 0.19 0.72 0.67 
Germany 0.99 0.51 0.27 0.96 4.91 0.02 0.84 0.59 
United States 0.94 0.53 0.78 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.63 0.73 
Australia 0.32 0.94 0.44 0.87 1.60 0.26 2.10 0.16 
France 2.48 0.24 1.60 0.38 0.14 0.99 0.06 1.00 
United Kingdom 0.62 0.74 3.09 0.07 0.93 0.54 0.96 0.52 
Japan 0.87 0.68 107.50 0.07 40.50 0.12 4243.00 0.01 
Italy 10.26 0.24 0.76 0.71 26.50 0.15 0.33 0.87 
The Netherlands 1.29 0.60 0.33 0.88 483.60 0.04 1.35 0.59 
Spain 6.08 0.30 0.17 0.95 7.40 0.28 0.21 0.93 
Belgium 0.82 0.69 0.61 0.76 1.07 0.63 288.40 0.05 
